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Transnational Human Rights Litigation and Territorialized Knowledge: 
Kiobel and the ‘Politics of Space’
Philip Liste 
Paper forthcoming in Transnational Legal Theory, vol. 5, no. 1 (2014) 
Abstract:  
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Dutch and British private corporations were accused of 
having aided and abetted in the violation of the human rights of individuals in Nigeria. A 
lawsuit, however, was brought in the United States, relying on the Alien Tort Statute—part of 
a Judiciary Act from 1789. In its final decision on the case, the US Supreme Court has 
strongly focused on ‘territory.’ This usage of a spatial category calls for closer scrutiny of 
how the making of legal arguments presupposes ‘spatial knowledge,’ especially in the field of 
transnational human rights litigation. Space is hardly a neutral category. What is at stake is 
normativity in a global scale with the domestic courtroom turned into a site of spatial 
contestation. The paper is interested in the construction of ‘the transnational’ as space, which 
implicates a ‘politics of space’ at work underneath the exposed surface of legal 
argumentation. The ‘Kiobel situation’ as it unfolded before the Supreme Court is addressed as 
example of a broader picture including a variety of contested elements of space: a particular 
spatial condition of modern nation-state territoriality; the production of ‘counter-space,’ 
eventually undermining the spatial regime of inter-state society; and the state not accepting its 
withering away. The paper will ask: How are normative boundaries between the involved 
jurisdictional spaces drawn? How do the ‘politics of space’ work underneath or beyond the 
plain moments of judicial decision-making? How territorialized is the legal knowledge at 
work and how does territoriality work in legal arguments? 
Keywords: Territoriality; Spatial Turn; Transnational Law; Transnational Human Rights 
Litigation; Conflict of Laws; Political Theory; Alien Torts Statute; Kiobel. 
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Transnational Human Rights Litigation and Territorialized Knowledge: 
Kiobel and the ‘Politics of Space’
Philip Liste1 
Paper forthcoming in Transnational Legal Theory, vol. 5, no.1 (2014) 
Abstract:  
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Dutch and British private corporations were 
accused of having aided and abetted in the violation of the human rights of individuals 
in Nigeria. A lawsuit, however, was brought in the United States, relying on the Alien 
Tort Statute—part of a Judiciary Act from 1789. In its final decision on the case, the 
US Supreme Court has strongly focused on ‘territory.’ This usage of a spatial category 
calls for closer scrutiny of how the making of legal arguments presupposes ‘spatial 
knowledge,’ especially in the field of transnational human rights litigation. Space is 
hardly a neutral category. What is at stake is normativity in a global scale with the 
domestic courtroom turned into a site of spatial contestation. The paper is interested in 
the construction of ‘the transnational’ as space, which implicates a ‘politics of space’ 
at work underneath the exposed surface of legal argumentation. The ‘Kiobel situation’ 
as it unfolded before the Supreme Court is addressed as example of a broader picture 
including a variety of contested elements of space: a particular spatial condition of 
modern nation-state territoriality; the production of ‘counter-space,’ eventually 
undermining the spatial regime of inter-state society; and the state not accepting its 
withering away. The paper will ask: How are normative boundaries between the 
involved jurisdictional spaces drawn? How do the ‘politics of space’ work underneath 
or beyond the plain moments of judicial decision-making? How territorialized is the 
legal knowledge at work and how does territoriality work in legal arguments? 
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. And even 
where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so 
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.2 
The logic of government is the logic of jurisdiction—question it and all that is solid 
melts into air.3 
1 Dr. Philip Liste, University of Hamburg, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences (Political Science, esp. 
Global Governance), Allende-Platz 1, 20146 Hamburg, Email: philip.liste@wiso.uni-hamburg.de.   
For insightful critique on earlier versions of the paper, I am grateful to Tanja Aalberts, Fred Aman, Hauke 
Brunkhorst, Hannah Buxbaum, Daniel Chernilo, Lauren Coyle, Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Katja Freistein, Alexis 
Galan, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Morag Goodwin, Friederike Kuntz, Hans Lindahl, Nick Onuf, Sven Opitz, 
Nik Rajkovic, Umut Turem, Wouter Werner, Antje Wiener, Peer Zumbansen and the participants of the Global 
Governance Colloquium, August 21, 2013 at University of Hamburg.  
2 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10-1491, slip op. (US Supreme Court Apr. 17, 2013) (hereinafter: 
Kiobel), 14.  
3 Richard T. Ford, "Law's Territory (a History of Jurisdiction)" (1999) 97 Michigan Law Review 843, 851. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the recent decision on Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum4 the US Supreme Court has 
put transnationalism in its place by strongly relying on the territorial logic of jurisdiction. The 
background was an attempt to escape from a Kafkaesque situation caused by abusive 
corporate power in the Global South. Royal Dutch Petroleum/Shell was accused of having 
aided and abetted in massive violations of human rights in Nigeria. The claims against the 
corporations were based on international law—for example, international norms against 
extrajudicial killings, crimes against humanity, and torture. None of the alleged violations of 
rights did occur in the United States nor was any of the petitioners a US citizen; and none of 
the corporations were having their headquarters in the United States. Nonetheless, the 
plaintiffs filed their claims against the corporations in a US District Court (Southern District 
of New York) relying on the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)—part of a Judiciary Act enacted by the 
First Congress of the United States in 1789. This ‘transnational situation’ can thus be said to 
transcend space and time. The Supreme Court has now decided that the claims that have been 
put forward by the petitioners do not ‘touch and concern the territory of the United States [...] 
with sufficient force’.5 The previous judgment of the Court of Appeals of the 2nd Circuit6 that 
had rejected the case in 2010 was thus affirmed.  
In this paper I assume that space is not a neutral category, not an objective fact. The 
making of any legal arguments presupposes a spatial knowledge that had become a critical 
matter of controversy in the field of transnational human rights litigation. What is at stake is 
4 Kiobel.  
5 Kiobel, p. 14. 
6 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2010). For the case history: United States District Court 
Southern District of New York, Kiobel, et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al., 02 Civ. 7618 (KMW) ( HBP), 
Order, Sep 29, 2006; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (U.S. Court of App., 2nd Cir. 2010); 
Oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States, Kiobel, et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., et al., 
Washington, D.C., Feb 28, 2012 < http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-
1491.pdf >; Oral argument (Reargument) before the Supreme Court of the United States, Kiobel, et al. v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., et al., Washington, D.C., Oct 1, 2012 < http://argument_transcripts/10-1491rearg.pdf >. 
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normativity in a global scale whereas the domestic courtroom is turned into the site of spatial 
contestation. Although the decision on Kiobel is arguably a moment of juridico-political 
gravity, with critical repercussions for the future possibilities of suing transnational 
corporations before US courts, the core interest of this paper is not primarily ‘juridical.’ The 
major interest is on the construction of ‘the transnational’ as space which implicates a 
‘politics of space’ at work underneath the exposed surface of legal argumentation.  
This struggle for spatial normativity, however, should not be taken as another 
dichotomous deployment of ‘the national’ vs. ‘the global’ in the sense of a globalization 
literature suffering from a binary conceptualization of the state on the one hand and a global 
society on the other.7 Even in the global scale, the everyday politics of the production of 
space operates in various sites, from international to sub-national settings. The ‘Kiobel 
situation’ as it unfolded before the Supreme Court fits nicely in this frame of locally contested 
global normativity. In this paper, Kiobel is thus addressed as example of a perhaps broader 
picture including a variety of contested spatial elements: a spatial condition of modern nation-
state territoriality; the production of ‘counter-space’,8 eventually undermining the spatial 
regime of inter-state society; and the state (in a broad sense) not accepting its withering 
away.9 The paper will question the production of normative space in the field of transnational 
human rights litigation. More specifically it will ask: How are normative boundaries between 
the involved jurisdictional spaces drawn? How do the ‘politics of space’ work underneath or 
beyond the moments of judicial gravity? In other words, how territorialized is the legal 
knowledge at work and how does territoriality work in legal arguments?  
Although finally decided in a highly territorialized way, Kiobel has up to this point 
caused enormous trouble. When starting from a nation-state paradigm, the mere possibility of 
7 For the criticism, see Saskia Sassen, “Neither Global nor National: Novel Assemblages of Territory, Authority 
and Rights” (2008) 1 Ethics & Global Politics 61.  
8 Henri Lefebvre, “The State in the Modern World (1975)” in Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (eds) State, Space, 
World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 117. 
9 Henri Lefebvre, “The Worldwide Experience (1978)” in Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (eds) State, Space, 
World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 278. 
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suing non-US private corporations for human rights violations in whatever places of the world 
before US courts can be said to be subversive. Kiobel, by representing the putative 
possibilities of the ATS, implicated a somehow disturbing ‘worldness’.10  
Before I can analyze how spatial politics are at work in the recent Supreme Court 
decision, I will first review a body of work in the social sciences including legal studies that is 
inspired by insights in critical geography and ask how in particular the field of transnational 
law has taken up this ‘philosophy of social space’11 (section 2). Taking up the concept of 
‘little nothings’,12 I will argue that critical reconfigurations of space do happen underneath the 
surface of exposed legal arguments. The focus will thus have to be shifted to what in 
following International Relations scholar Jef Huysmans I call ‘little litigation nothings’ 
(section 3). The analysis will then illustrate how in Kiobel territoriality was weighted 
remarkably high by juxtaposing the Supreme Court majority’s spatial mode of production 
with ‘counter-spaces’ as raised in the concurring opinion by Justice Breyer (section 4). 
Finally, I will end with a cursory evaluation of what Kiobel may mean to social space (section 
5).  
2. LEGAL TERRITORIALITIES AS SOCIAL SPACE
Since 1980 and the groundbreaking Filàrtiga case,13 human rights litigation cases 
have been brought to US courts by using the ATS which was enacted already in 1789 and 
holds that ‘[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien 
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States’.14 
10 ibid.  
11 David Harvey, “The Sociological and Geographical Imaginations” (2005) 18 International Journal of Politics, 
Culture, and Society 211, 213. 
12 See Jef Huysmans, “What's in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings” (2011) 42 
Security Dialogue 371. 
13 Filàrtiga  v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (U.S. Court of App., 2nd Cir. 30 June 1980) (hereinafter Filàrtiga).  
14 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Corresponding ATS lawsuit are: Filàrtiga; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) 
(hereinafter: Sosa); Roe v. Bridgestone, 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1008 (S.D. Ind. 2007); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2010); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 744 F. Supp. 2d 810 (S.D. Ind. 
6 
Hence, the ATS provides a critical interface of international law and domestic jurisprudence, 
no matter what substance international law had in the late 18th century.15 As such interface the 
ATS has been embraced particularly by various human rights advocates in order to sue private 
corporations for their involvement in diverse atrocities in the Global South, with Kiobel 
eventually being the most prominent—and perhaps sudden end point—of these lawsuits on 
abusive corporate power.  
Territoriality 
When understood as a signpost to an emerging transnational constellation, 
transnational litigation may indeed challenge the base lines of an inter-state world order with 
territoriality as its major principle. Taking this as a starting point, analysis could move 
towards various directions. First, the territoriality of an international normative order could be 
taken for granted, like a vast body of work in IR has done for decades.16 The primary concern 
would then be on the ’natural’ limits of transnational human rights litigation and whether or 
not corresponding transnational legal strategies may someday succeed. Likewise the question 
could be raised as to how human rights could (or should) be enforced against the background 
2010); and Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 642 F.3d 1013 (2011). This script for the transnational legal 
process, to be clear, stems from the late 18th century and even precedes Immanuel Kant’s seminal remark on the 
idea of a Weltbürgerrecht (cosmopolitan condition): “Da es nun mit der unter den Völkern der Erde einmal 
durchgängig überhand genommenen (engeren und oder weiteren) Gemeinschaft so weit gekommen ist, daß die 
Rechtsverletzung an einem Platz der Erde von allen gefühlt wird: so ist die Idee eines Weltbürgerrechts keine 
phantastische und überspannte Vorstellungsart des Rechts, sonder eine notwendige Ergänzung des 
ungeschriebenen Kodex, sowohl des Staats- als Völkerrechts zum öffentlichen Menschenrechte überhaupt, und 
so zum ewigen Frieden, zu dem man sich der kontinuierlichen Annäherung zu befinden nur unter dieser 
Bedingung schmeicheln darf.” (Immanuel Kant, "Schrift Zum Ewigen Frieden," in Wilhelm Weischedel (ed) 
Werkausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1964 [1795]), 216-17). 
15 See Filàrtiga, 881 (‘Thus it is clear that courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it 
has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.’). 
16 For the prototypical canon, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978); Robert O. Keohane, “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge 
After the Cold War”, in David A. Baldwin (ed) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Andrew Moravcsik, “Liberal International Relations Theory: A 
Scientific Assessment”, in Colin  Elman and Miriam Fendius  Elman (eds) Progress in International Relations 
Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 159; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: 
McGraw-Hill, 1979). For early criticisms, see John G. Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing 
Modernity in International Relations”, International Organization 47 (1993), 139-174; R.B.J. Walker, 
Inside/Outside International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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of an international regime of territoriality. Second, the challenge of transnational litigation 
could be taken for granted, e.g. as a now given phenomenon of globalization that the world of 
nation-states would have to cope with. The major concern would then be on normative order 
in the global realm. The question would be what normative changes may be caused or how a 
normative order touched by phenomena of transnational human rights litigation would look 
like. The assumption in this paper, however, is that these two views can hardly be separated. 
Both views relate to each other in highly productive ways; and I argue that ‘the political’ 
comes in with this inter-relatedness. The aim is thus to extrapolate the social productivity of 
the very relation between taken-for-granted territoriality and taken-for-granted phenomena of 
globalization.  
Following a now remarkable body of work emphasizing the spatiality of state, sub-
state, and non-state politics,17 such phenomena of contested normativity as contested space—
and I see transnational litigation as one such phenomenon—can hardly be understood as 
operating against the background of an eternally fixed and externally given regime of 
territoriality. Rather, the meaning of territory or space turns into a matter of controversy. 
Following insights inspired by critical geography,18 space and territoriality cannot be treated 
as given but must be understood as contingent, i.e. as result of a history of territorial fixes, 
17 John Agnew, “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumption of International Relations Theory” (1994) 
1 Review of International Political Economy 53; John Agnew, “Know-Where: Geographies of Knowledge of 
World Politics” (2007) 1 International Political Sociology 138; Neil Brenner, and Stuart Elden, “Henri Lefebvre 
on State, Space, Territory” (2009) 3 International Political Sociology 353; Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden, 
“Introduction. State, Space, World: Lefebvre and the Survival of Capitalism” in Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden 
(eds), State, Space, World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); Saskia Sassen, “Neither Global 
nor National: Novel Assemblages of Territory, Authority and Rights” (2008) 1 Ethics & Global Politics 61; 
Nisha Shah, “The Territorial Trap of the Territorial Trap: Global Transformation and the Problem of the State's 
Two Territories” (2012) 6 International Political Sociology 57; Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, 
“Introduction: Rethinking Theories of the State in an Age of Globalization” in Aradhana Sharma and Akhil 
Gupta (eds), The Anthropology of the State: A Reader (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 1. 
18 Michel Foucault, “Questions on Geography”, in Michel Foucault (ed.), Power/Knowledge (transl. by C. 
Gordon) (New York: Pantheon, 1980); Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces” (1986) 16 Diacritics 22; David 
Harvey, Social Justice and the City (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973); Harvey, “The 
Sociological and Geographical Imaginations”; Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 1991); Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social 
Theory (London: Verso, 1989).  
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socially constructed in an ongoing social process. Criticism like that of the ‘territorial trap’,19 
‘methodological nationalism’,20 or a state-centered ‘obstacle épistemologique’21 mark a 
fundamental engagement with eventually problematic categories. John Agnew has 
insightfully phrased this epistemological moment as ‘geographies of knowledge’.22 By 
knowledge, as he himself defines, he means ‘explanatory schemes, frames of reference, 
crucial sets of assumptions, narrative traditions, and theories’.23 Geographical knowledge 
does underlie any practice relevant in the ongoing reproduction of space and place. In fact, the 
mere imagination of political rule as territorially fixed affects what forms of governance are 
conceivable and what not. The epistemological configuration of space matters because 
geographical knowledge is necessary for the legitimization of power.24 Hence, governance 
agencies like those of the state are deeply involved in the production of space. They create the 
space in which their legitimacy unfolds.  
Socially constructed space, in other words, serves a purpose—and is produced for 
particular purposes.25 Space can thus no longer be understood as a physically given 
precondition of governmental formations but becomes itself subject to governance practice.26 
To analyze such ‘uses of space’ as meaningful for political, legal, economic or other social 
purposes, it is necessary to rely on practice, that is, practice of rendering space meaningful in 
particular ways. Borrowing from anthropological work, I will call this practice knowledge 
                                                 
19 John Agnew, “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumption of International Relations Theory”.  
20 Ulrich Beck, Macht Und Gegenmacht Im Globalen Zeitalter: Neue Weltpolitische Ökonomie (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), ch. II. 
21 Gunther Teubner, "Fragmented Foundations: Social Constitutionalism Beyond the Nation State," in Petra 
Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
328. 
22 John Agnew, “Know-Where: Geographies of Knowledge of World Politics”.  
23 Ibid.: 138.  
24 Shah, “The Territorial Trap of the Territorial Trap: Global Transformation and the Problem of the State's Two 
Territories”, 60. 
25 Lefebvre, The Production of Space. 
26 See Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations”. 
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practice;27 and since this paper is concerned with litigation and the production of space, I am 
particularly interested in spatial knowledge practice.   
As the political space of modern nation-state territoriality is entangled within a 
particular—and historically contingent28—form of governance, spatial practice may affect the 
state. The reproduction of political space turns into a practice of governance itself and relates 
to what may be called a spatial strategy.29 Thus understood, transcending the form of 
governance typical of the system of sovereign nation-states can be understood as a form of 
resistance against an established regime of space30 or, to take up a concept of Henri Lefebvre, 
a ‘state mode of production [mode de production etatique]’.31 While the practice of filing 
transnational lawsuits in domestic courts (in the US) could then be analyzed as a resistant 
spatial strategy, corresponding practices of sustaining the territorialized state mode of 
production would be a counter-strategy. The State, as Lefebvre puts it, ‘will not let itself 
wither away or be overcome without resistance’,32 whereas ‘the state’ should here not be 
understood in a narrow sense only as state government.33 The territoriality of the state finds 
itself confronted with a commonsensical state of territoriality, reproduced through a variety of 
different actors. In this paper, the courtroom will be focused as the site of corresponding 
spatial struggles—resistance and perpetuation.  
 
Law and Space 
                                                 
27 Annelise Riles, “Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage” (2006) 108 
American Anthropologist 52. 
28 Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations”; Boaventura de 
Sousa  Santos, “Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law”, 14 Journal of Law and 
Society 279 (1987). 
29 Brenner and Elden, “Introduction: State, Space World: Lefebvre and the Survival of Capitalism”, 33; Henri 
Lefebvre, “Reflections on the Politics of Space (1970)” in Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (eds), State, Space, 
World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 180.  
30 See Henri Lefebvre, “The Worldwide and the Planetary (1973)” in Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (eds), State, 
Space, World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 204.  
31 Henri Lefebvre, “Space and the State (1978)” in Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (eds), State, Space, World 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 226.  
32 Lefebvre, “The Worldwide Experience (1978),” 278. 
33 See Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation),” in 
Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta (eds) The Anthropology of the State: A Reader (Malden: Blackwell, 2006). 
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Speaking in terms of legal knowledge, we can now argue that practice like the making 
of international legal treaties is only rendered intelligible (or knowable) against the 
background of a particular kind of geographical knowledge, that is, an inter-state normative 
paradigm. In turn, the international legal conduct of states can be understood as a knowledge 
practice that reproduces this inter-state paradigm. Despite the perhaps internationalist 
orientation of its protagonists, the ‘esprit d’internationalité’,34 international law builds upon a 
highly territorialized knowledge of the world.35 Notably, things may be different with 
transnational law. I assume that transnational legal practice may (but not necessarily must) 
further an alternative body of spatial knowledge. A major concern of this paper is thus to 
establish a research framework for analyzing the production of transnational law’s space.  
Before this argument can be unfolded it is necessary to elaborate the nexus between 
territory and law or the spatial moment of jurisdiction, respectively. Though not extending his 
consideration to the fields of international or transnational relations, a remarkable advance has 
been established by Richard Ford in his ‘Law’s Territory’.36 Ford’s spatial argument parallels 
the above considered work on the geographical knowledge upon which governance (or in 
Ford’s case: government) bases. ‘The logic of government is the logic of jurisdiction—
question it and all that is solid melts into air’.37 With respect to the territoriality of 
jurisdictional claims, Ford convincingly suggests to understand jurisdiction as discourse or 
social practice,38 respectively. This is not to say, as he moves on, that jurisdictional lines are 
not ‘real’ but, in fact, they have to be ‘made real’39 by applying the law, e.g. in the daily 
administrative process or by determining its reach in the course of juridical decision-making.  
                                                 
34 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 13. 
35 Karen Knop, “Statehood: Territoty, People, Government,” in James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (eds) 
The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
36 Ford, "Law's Territory (a History of Jurisdiction)". 
37 Ibid.: 851. 
38 Ibid.: 855. 
39 Ibid.: 856. 
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What is important is that we are concerned with just another—now legal—dimension 
of the constructed reality of governance. ‘Lines on a map may anticipate jurisdiction, but a 
jurisdiction itself consists of the practices that make the abstract space depicted on a map 
significant’.40 The determination of jurisdictional boundaries, of the law’s territory, to take up 
Ford’s title, consists in an everyday legal practice of such signification.41 What works well for 
the political deployment of geographical knowledge as a means of governance, does also 
work for jurisdiction—in the sense of a spatial politics of law. Whether and how different 
things or individuals are (or become) subject to regulation depends on how jurisdiction is 
framed. Thus understood, jurisdiction is but a technology of governance.42  
The framework provided by Ford can easily be extended to the global realm where 
jurisdiction though organized along the lines of nation-state boundaries for centuries is 
contested and national jurisdiction finds itself challenged by legal practice, especially with 
respect to universal jurisdiction.43 Hence, as technology jurisdiction is also applied in the 
global realm, in various social settings and times. The political moment of this can hardly be 
formulated smarter as through the final words of Ford’s insightful piece:  
The history of space and spaces offers a rogue’s gallery of cartographers, imperialists, 
merchant adventurers, medieval rulers, town constables, urban visionaries, architects, 
judges and jurists. But in all these there are only protagonists, no heroes. The heroes 
and heroines, perhaps, are yet to come.44  
It could be added that an evolving transnational space may be their stage. That said, 
the questions can be raised what a ‘transnational space’ is, how it comes into being, and what 
role legal practice plays in that process. 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 For a useful concept of signification, see Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London and New York: Verso, 2001). For a concept of the 
‘everyday,’ see Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (translated by Steven F. Rendall) (Berkeley: 
University of Californial Press, 1988). 
42 See Ford, "Law's Territory (a History of Jurisdiction)," 867. 
43 See William J. Aceves, “Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet Case and the Move 
Towards a Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation” (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 
129; Wolfgang Kaleck, “From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction in Europe 1998-2008” (2009) 30 
Michigan Journal of International Law 927. 





The term transnational law has been introduced into legal studies in the 1950s by 
Philip Jessup who used it in order to ‘include all law which regulates actions or events that 
transcend national frontiers’.45 ‘Transnational situations,’ as Jessup held, ‘may involve 
individuals, corporations, states, organizations of states, or other groups’.46 Facing such 
multiplicity of actors beyond the confines of the territorial state, a clear-cut demarcation of 
domestic and international legal spheres can hardly be upheld. Transnational situations may 
indeed challenge the inter-state paradigm—not only with respect to legal relations.  
More recently, Harold Koh relies on the ‘transnational legal process’ in order to 
explain state compliance with international law. The argument is that international law is 
already operating on various sub-state levels in such a way that state governments are no 
longer free in their decision to opt out. The ‘[t]ransnational legal process,’ as Koh puts it,  
describes the theory and practice of how public and private actors—nation-states, 
international organizations, multinational enterprises, non-governmental 
organizations, and private individuals—interact in a variety of public and private, 
domestic and international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize 
rules of transnational law.47 
While neither interest-based nor identity-based theories would provide convincing 
answers to the compliance puzzle, Koh assumes that it is the repeated interaction of a variety 
of actors within the nation-state but also across state boundaries that generates a situation in 
which breaches of international would cause frictions.48 A network of legal interactions across 
national boundaries does also play a decisive role in the work of Anne-Marie Slaughter who 
holds that various state agencies would increasingly cooperate across boundaries with their 
                                                 
45 Jessup, Transnational Law, 2. 
46 Ibid., 3. 
47 Harold Hongju Koh, “Transnational Legal Process” (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181, 183-4.  
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foreign counterparts. While this narrative of what Slaughter calls a ‘New World Order’49 
indeed involves the development of border-transcending governance networks, the focus 
remains on state actors though ‘disaggregated’ in their sovereignty.50 Slaughter’s account can 
thus be considered ‘trans-governmental’ rather that ‘transnational.’  
Facing the transnational challenges of law, some legal scholars have also relied on the 
global or transnational realm as space. Proponents of the Global Administrative Law (GAL) 
project argue  
that current circumstances call for recognition of a global administrative space, 
distinct from the space of inter-state relations governed by international law and the 
domestic regulatory space governed by domestic administrative law, although 
encompassing elements of each.51  
What is coming to the fore in this passage is that the mentioned ‘global administrative 
space’—as now being ‘recognized’—is in need of regulation, that is, a particular kind of 
regulation which emancipates itself from the nation-state constitutional bonds though taking 
up impulses from ‘administrative law.’ But we should be aware that this is a normative 
argument since the GAL approach takes for granted that regulatory space—including its 
particular needs of being governed—is already there. What is neglected is that the practice of 
(global) administration, in turn, also affects (or even creates) space. GAL already implicates a 
certain normative order which is axiomatically set beyond the approach’s theoretical 
reflection. GAL, in other words, lacks a theoretical account on power, i.e. a theory of how 
space comes into being by way of everyday politico-legal practice. In so doing, the approach 
is by no means less ‘normative’ than the constitutionalist accounts criticized by GAL as too 
wide-ranging in a normative sense.52  
                                                 
49 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
50 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law in a World of Liberal States” (1995) 6 European Journal of 
International Law 503, 505.  
51 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Steward, "The Emergence of Global Administrative Law" 
(2005) Law and Contemporary Problems 15, 26 (my emphasis).  
52 Nico Krisch, "Global Administrative Law and the Constitutionalist Ambition" (2009) LSE Law, Society and 
Economic Working Papers 10/2009. For the debate on global constitutionalism, see Jan Klabbers, “Setting the 
Scene,” in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds) The Constitutionalization of International Law 
14 
 
Some global53 or transnational54 legal pluralists have indeed offered a more 
sophisticated account of transnational space. While in part, ‘transnational space’ is used as a 
rather empty label,55 Paul Schiff Berman by relying on insights in the field of critical 
geography criticizes that ‘although the social and political construction of space is a 
fundamental aspect of legal ordering, the constructed nature of the enterprise disappears from 
analytical purview’.56 Instead of elaborating the nexus of the construction of space and legal 
ordering, however, the argument widely circles around the concept of ‘community’. 
Paralleling the ‘imagined community’ argument by Benedict Anderson,57 Berman takes issue 
with the detaining of community in the nation-state. The particular modes how community is 
constructed and how the practice of community-building relates to law, however, remain 
underdeveloped—although this would be the crucial point. While this criticism on setting the 
nation-state as the natural space for community is indeed an important requisite for doing 
away with the ‘state-based focus of international law’,58 the arguments of a constructed nature 
of things, as well as, the objectification of communal and/ or legal knowledge are not fully 
exhausted. In the end, community building is ‘transnational’ when transcending the 
boundaries of the nation state. The more far reaching claim in line with insights in critical 
geography,59 however, would be to say that building community would mean to create space, 
i.e. the construction of community and the production of space will always go hand in hand. 
The notion of a constructed community alone cannot provide satisfying answers to how law 
and space are interrelated.  
                                                                                                                                                        
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Antje Wiener, Anthony F Jr Lang, James Tully, Miguel P 
Maduro and Mattias Kumm, “Why a New Journal on Global Constitutionalism? Editorial” (2012) 1 Global 
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53 Paul Schiff Berman, "The New Legal Pluralism" (2009) 5 Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences 225.  
54 Peer Zumbansen, “Transnational Legal Pluralism” (2010) 1 Transnational Legal Theory 141.  
55 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, "Transnational Spaces: Norms and Legitimacy" (2008) 33 Yale Journal of 
International Law 479. 
56 Paul Schiff Berman, "From International Law to Law and Globalization" (2005) 43 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 485, 514. See also Ford, "Law's Territory (a History of Jurisdiction)." 
57 Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1999); see Berman, "From International Law to Law and Globalization," 516-17.  
58 Berman, "From International Law to Law and Globalization," 518. 
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While implicating a similar criticism, Peer Zumbansen in a number of articles 
proposes a ‘methodological’ approach to ‘the transnational’: It is not the ‘extension of […] 
normativity across borders’ that the term transnational points to.60 ‘Instead,’ as Zumbansen 
holds,  
the term transnational identifies an intricate connection of spatial and conceptual 
dimensions: in addressing, on the one hand, the demarcation of emerging and evolving 
spaces and, on the other, the construction of these spaces as artifacts for human 
activity, communication and rationality, the term transnational is conceptual. To 
declare an activity as being transnational is not just the result of an empirical 
observation.61  
What is at issue is but the productivity of transnational observations. The critical 
question is thus how we can know a transnational constellation when seeing it. Put differently, 
observing ‘the transnational’ already implies certain preconditions. By describing an 
interaction as transnational we already assume—i.e. construct—a certain space where this 
interaction takes place. Using the term ‘methodology,’ however, does not prompt 
clarification. The crucial question is one of epistemology—how we are able to know the 
transnational—and Zumbansen rightly holds that we cannot know by just recognizing a social 
interaction as crossing nation-state borders.62 In fact, the interesting moment is not the 
crossing of jurisdictional boundaries itself but the way how the meaning of such border-
crossing phenomena is conceived and determined. Kiobel, as will be illustrated below, is a 
nice example of how spatial meaning is produced. Since transnational law—now understood 
as such epistemological practice—may consist in the creation of its own operational space, 
knowledge provided in the course of the transnational legal process generates ‘truth’. 
Transnational law, when understood as spatial knowledge practice is to be conceived as 
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highly political because as practice it immediately affects the knowledge-power nexus and 
contributes to generating a régime du savoir.63 To take this ‘political moment’ of spatial 
knowledge into account a framework of analysis must remain open for discursive 
interventions putting transnational law in charge as means for whatever ends. In principle, this 
could include both, spatial resistance as well as a perpetuation of the established ‘state mode 
of production’.64 Transnational law is to be understood as a technique of spatial production,65 
and is thus deeply involved in a politics of space.  
This is the broader frame in which this paper seeks to analyze the production of space 
in the course of transnational human rights litigation. If the ‘domestic’ courtroom becomes 
(or: is transformed into) a site where the production of space is ‘negotiated’ by means of 
transnational law, the dense and historically congealed link between territoriality and 
jurisdiction66 and thus the established demarcations between national and international 
affairs, as well as, between public and private forms of governance67 are made subject to 
highly contested legal knowledge practice.  
In this respect, the aim is to put the phenomenon of transnational human rights 
litigation in broader perspective. It cannot be taken for granted that transnational law is but a 
manifestation of a globalized world. In the process of transnational litigation different 
actors—petitioners and respondents, as well as, sympathizers of either of the two sides—may 
use ‘transnational law’ for different purposes like the perpetuation of jurisdictional state 
boundaries, the establishment of universal jurisdiction, or the exclusion of private enterprise 
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from public (legal) regulation.68 The dichotomist assumption of ‘national jurisdiction and the 
state’ vs. ‘transnational legal process as globalization’ would be like tapping into the 
‘territorial trap’69 while walking along the legal path. In order to remain open for actual 
(legal) relations of production, analyses may not reproduce the zero-sum imaginary of more 
globalization and less state.70  
 
3. LITTLE LITIGATION NOTHINGS 
The recent Supreme Court decision on Kiobel significantly cuts future possibilities to 
sue human rights violators before US courts, particularly when the relevant conduct occurred 
on the territory of a foreign sovereign. While human rights advocates criticize the decision as 
disappointing,71 those speaking in the name of private business hail the judicial strengthening 
of the state.72 In fact, the decision points to an exclusion of private conduct beyond the 
jurisdictional boundaries of the Unites States from being adjudicated through US courts, even 
when massive violations of human rights are at issue. But at the same time this exclusion is 
achieved only by way of a perpetuation of nation-state boundaries: transnational private 
governance goes hand-in-hand with ‘modern’—perhaps ‘post-modern’—nation-state practice. 
Although the decision on Kiobel can be understood as a moment of juridico-political 
‘gravity’, the mentioned spatial issues are somehow ‘subliminal,’ i.e. not present on the 
surface of legal argumentation. A mainly ‘legal’ analysis of the decision, however, risks 
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veiling the micro-politics at work in everyday legal knowledge practices. While true, 
territoriality was weighted remarkably high in the Supreme Court’s Kiobel decision, debate is 
rather focusing on future possibilities of litigation, not the spatial repercussions of the case.73 
But it is this latter moment that interests me from a social science perspective. It is this latter 
perspective on global normativity that puts the ‘workings of geographies of knowledge’74 on 
the agendas of an empirical engagement with transnational law. The (global) regulation of 
world society operates in a variety of (local) sites—a ‘good part of globalization consists of an 
enormous variety of subnational micro-processes’75—with the domestic courtroom as one of 
these sites.  
In sum, the underlying idea is to analyze Kiobel with respect to how territoriality and 
space are constructed, i.e. whether and how taken positions are built upon bodies of 
territorialized knowledge and how these positions, in turn, contribute to the regime of space. 
To this end, Kiobel is deployed analytically as the site to observe a legal politics of space at 
work. Being inspired by Jef Huysmans’ concept of ‘little security nothings,’ I switch the focus 
to little litigation nothings—’devices, sites, practices without exceptional significance’.76 In 
so doing, I also follow a stream of ‘ethnographic’ work on inter- or transnational relations as 
outlined, inter alia, in early feminist studies in IR (in the late 1980s).77 Culminating in the 
slogan that ‘the personal is international’,78 Cynthia Enloe argues that ‘we can acquire a more 
realistic understanding of how international politics actually “works”’79 by analyzing politics 
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beyond the visible international situations like international meetings of the (mostly male) 
heads of states.  
While Kiobel is considered a landmark decision, exceptional in a way, the territorial 
patterns at work are not the exposed matter of attention. The little litigation nothings, it is now 
argued, do the reproductive work on the meaning of jurisdictional space and/ or the spatial 
knowledge of law, respectively. The core analytical assumption is that legal arguments, 
though not necessarily intended to reproduce social space, tend to take on a life of their own. 
It is thus not the substance of a legal argument but the way how these arguments are used as a 
‘crucial technology’ of the ‘legal infrastructure’80 that tells us a lot about the political moment 
of transnational litigation. By analyzing one transnational legal process with respect to such 
little litigation nothings I do, at the same time, propose a type of analysis that focuses on the 
everyday life of ‘the transnational.’ It is only this perspective on the little litigation nothings 
rendering the hidden politics of space visible.  
 
4. KIOBEL: THE SPATIAL POLITICS OF LAW AT WORK 
In Kiobel, a politics of space became most obvious when the Supreme Court in March 
2012 switched the focus from the question of corporate liability to territoriality.81 While the 
Appeals Court of the 2nd Circuit had rejected the Kiobel case for reasons of corporate liability 
(or non-liability, to be clear),82 the Supreme Court, after having heard oral arguments in 
February 2012, invited the parties for another round of ‘rearguments,’ focusing on the 
question of ‘Whether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute allows courts to 
recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory 
of a sovereign other than the United States.’ In the judgment, the court widely concentrates on 
this spatial dimension of the case—while, at the same time, treating the questions of corporate 
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liability and the substance of international law to be applied under the ATS as rather 
peripheral. Space, in other words, was chosen as the very core of the case.  
By more or less replicating the mentioned question for the rearguments session, the 
court points out in the decision that ‘[t]he question presented is whether and under what 
circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute, for 
violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the 
United States’.83 In the opinion, the principle of the presumption against extraterritorial 
application—that is, a principle that US law shall not be applied beyond the state borders—
was introduced as a ‘natural’ limit to ATS litigation. ‘That canon,’ as the court’s majority put 
it, ‘provides that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it 
has none”’.84 In general, the rationale behind the presumption is to prevent interferences of 
US law into the sovereignty of foreign states. No doubt, the claims brought against Royal 
Dutch Petroleum/ Shell possess such extraterritorial reach. The question was thus whether 
there is something in the ATS that would rebut the presumption.85 The majority’s answer 
was: No. ‘The ATS covers actions by aliens for violations of the law of nations, but that does 
not imply extraterritorial reach—such violations affecting aliens can occur either within or 
outside the United States’.86  
Although being an interface between international law and domestic jurisprudence, the 
extraterritorial reach of the statute is not acknowledged. The ATS is interpreted as falling 
short of giving a ‘clear indication of an extraterritorial application’.87 The question can be 
posed, however, whether the absence of a ‘clear indication’ really is that clear. Indeed, diverse 
objections to the majority’s reasoning of the decision were raised. ‘The ATS,’ as Justice 
Breyer holds, ‘was enacted with “foreign matters” in mind. The statute’s text refers explicitly 
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87 Kiobel, p. 4.  
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to “alien[s],” “treat[ies],” and “the law of nations”’.88 And by relying on the judgment in the 
Sosa case,89 he argues that ‘at least one of the three kinds of activities that we found to fall 
within the statute’s scope, namely piracy […] normally takes place abroad’.90 Against the 
backdrop of these alternatives, the argumentative path chosen by the majority is hardly as 
self-evident as it is presented. Thus understood, the ATS although ‘bringing international law 
home’,91 falls short of transcending national territoriality. In order to make this a case, the 
court pursues a ‘politics of space.’  
The spatial moment in the Supreme Court decision, strangely enough, finds an 
expression in the way how Kiobel is related to piracy. In the historical record of 
jurisprudence, piracy was brought up as a possible target of ATS litigation,92 so that today 
there is hardly any doubt that pirates would be liable under the statute. But what do pirates 
have to do with human rights violations through private corporations? In fact, piracy was 
discussed with regard to the question of corporate liability. While despite the sometimes 
obviously abusive conduct of private corporations it would be difficult to argue that 
corporations act like pirates, a parallelization of conduct of pirates and corporations is 
interesting from a legal point of view: since pirates clearly pursue an economic objective they 
may indeed be ‘like’ corporations. As a result, the argument could be raised that if pirates are 
liable under the ATS, so are corporations.93  
                                                 
88 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10-1491, slip op. (US Supreme Court Apr. 17, 2013) (Breyer, 
concurring) (hereinafter: Breyer), p. 3. 
89 Sosa, 732.  
90 Breyer, p. 4.  
91 Harold Hongju Koh, “Bringing International Law Home” (1998) 35 Houston Law Review xxx. 
92 Sosa, 732.  
93 In fact, this hypothetical parallel finds its expression in Kiobel as ‘Pirates Inc.’ In the first of two oral 
argument sessions when the focus of the case seemed to be on corporate liability, Justice Breyer confronted 
Kathleen M. Sullivan—she was pleading in front of the court for the respondent side—like this: ‘Do you think in 
the 18th century if they brought Pirates, Incorporated, and we get all their gold, and Blackbeard gets up and he 
says, oh, it isn’t me; it’s the corporation—do you think that they would have then said: Oh, I see, it’s a 
corporation. Good-bye. Go home.’93 Sullivan’s answer was this: ‘Justice Breyer, yes, the corporation would not 
be liable.’ The NGO Earth Rights International has put a video on its website taking up this somehow bizarre 




But piracy stayed an issue, even after the court had switched the focus to 
territoriality—perhaps even as a hidden (‘invisibilized’) Achilles’ heel in the court majority’s 
opinion. The reason for this is that piracy, no doubt, has an extraterritorial dimension. While it 
seems to be established that pirates would be liable under the ATS and, at the same time, the 
extraterritorial dimension of piracy is taken for granted, it is eventually inconsistent to say that 
the ATS has no extraterritorial reach. Acknowledging the right under international law to 
seize pirates in whatever place may not be compatible with saying that nothing in the ATS 
would rebut the extraterritorial presumption.  
Applying U. S. law to pirates, however, does not typically impose the sovereign will 
of the United States onto conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of 
another sovereign […]. Pirates […] generally did not operate within any jurisdiction. 
[…] We do not think that the existence of a cause of action against them is a sufficient 
basis for concluding that other causes of action under the ATS reach conduct that does 
occur within the territory of another sovereign; pirates may well be a category unto 
themselves.94 
In fact, pirates are made a ‘category unto themselves’ within this passage by being 
located somewhere beyond territorial jurisdiction, i.e. in a non-space. Piracy is de-
territorialized. That productive determination, however, is hardly without any alternative. 
‘The majority,’ as Justice Breyer puts it,  
cannot wish this piracy example away by emphasizing that piracy takes place on the 
high seas […]. That is because the robbery and murder that make up piracy do not 
normally take place in the water; they take place on a ship. And a ship is like land, in 
that it falls within the jurisdiction of the nation whose flag it flies.95  
And that would of course, as Breyer continues, ‘typically involve applying our law to 
acts taking place within the jurisdiction of another sovereign.’96 The issue at stake is, in other 
words, how to locate piracy in a normative space. Piracy is spatially signified and thus 
ascribed with a certain spatial meaning that, in turn, generates an Achilles’ heel of the legal 
argument. The majority’s construction of piracy while operating in a normative non-space 
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contributes to the plausibility of the whole spatial story that is put forward with the decision. 
Since pirates are granted a certain position in the record of ATS jurisprudence, locating their 
activity on another sovereign’s territory would undermine the ‘extraterritorial presumption’ 
argument. In sum, piracy is not a mere sideshow. The spatial construction of piracy as a 
‘category unto themselves’ rather contributes to a productive spatial narrative and is thus 
brought up as a decisive tool in the rejection of the case.  
As a result, the Kiobel decision curtails the scope for future human rights suits against 
transnational private corporations remarkably. The role which the underlying spatial 
knowledge plays becomes highly obvious in the last passages of the opinion. In the text, limits 
to future lawsuits against corporations are particularly established through an emphasis on the 
relation between corporative conduct and the territory of the United States.  
And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they 
must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial 
application […]. Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach 
too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices.97  
With regard to the future scope of legal possibilities one could raise the argument that 
the court has left things in the dark.98 The ‘touch and concern’ formula is setting a fluid 
criterion. While the mere corporate presence on US territory is now said to be an insufficient 
relation, this would not per se preclude creative constructions of inter-relations between space 
and conduct in the future.99 From a social science point of view—and particularly with regard 
to the theoretical argument on the production of space—the problem is more fundamental and 
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grounds in a problematic spatial circularity of the discussed legal decision. Although deeply 
involved in the production of space, the court presents territory as physically given. Territory 
is thus ‘naturalized’ and, in so doing, a veil is drawn over the political nature of social space. 
The court works with the very notion of territory and space which is so fundamentally 
questioned by the literature in the field of critical geography and beyond. In sum, if we 
assume that territory is constructed and that legal text like a decision of the US Supreme 
Courts participates in an ongoing process of the production of space, the ‘touch and concern’ 
formula appears in a different light.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have argued that transnational human rights litigation may cut through 
the heart of a territorialized legal knowledge. In order to establish a framework for the critical 
analysis of human rights litigation, territory and space have been understood as not physically 
given but as constructed in an ongoing social and socio-legal process. Legal practice like in 
Kiobel makes sense only against the background of a particular spatial knowledge. 
‘Transnational’ jurisprudence is affected because, in the first place, legal practice will have to 
make sense of ‘the transnational.’ Put differently, ‘the transnational’ will have to be 
constructed as a space within which a certain legal practice makes sense. Since the established 
construction of territory has such critical repercussions on how legal arguments can be 
developed, territoriality turns into a legal technology.  
Where the congealed notion of territorial jurisdiction is questioned, the solid ground of 
historically congealed governance structures ‘melts into air’.100 By borrowing from Marx’ and 
Engels’ Manifesto Ford nicely points out how much is at stake where space become a matter 
of controversy, even where the spatial moment of controversy is not made too explicit. In this 
paper, Kiobel has been understood as a critical site of such contestation. When facing such a 
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threat to established modes of governance—the state mode of production—state institutions, 
like courts, cannot be expected to ‘let itself wither away or be overcome without 
resistance’.101 On the one hand, the Supreme Court’s decision on Kiobel could be interpreted 
as such resistant practice in a world of states challenged by globalization. On the other hand, 
this interpretation draws on a too broad-brushed narrative of globalization and the state, no 
longer (if ever) suitable for depicting global complexity.  
By curtailing further possibilities of suing private corporations under the ATS the 
Supreme Court has effectively closed a door for transnational human rights litigation and 
preserved a certain space for private enterprise in the global realm. While the spatial 
restrictions on jurisdiction as reproduced in the Kiobel decision reinforce state boundaries 
they also affect the conditions of private enterprise beyond these now reinforced boundaries. 
Limiting the jurisdiction of the nation-state means by implication that evolving structures of 
private governance in the Global South will not become subject to state regulation. This adds 
up to the argument that the state is not a victim of globalization but is itself deeply involved in 
the construction of ‘globalized’ space.102 In turn, transnational private corporations are—
perhaps paradoxically—involved in the preservation of the state and its jurisdictional space. 
What emerges is a public-private partnership in its own right,103 with the result that the 
Kafkaesque situation of—in this case Nigerian—individuals not permitted entrance to the law 
remains in ‘place.’  
The attempt to establish universal jurisdiction can of course be seen as problematic, 
for example in the sense of a de facto imperial projection of US jurisdiction to the world. 
Likewise, the criticism can be raised with respect to unintended reciprocity. The mere 
possibility of courts in other countries deciding on corporate conduct in the US may prompt 
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serious doubts. The spatial analysis of Kiobel, however, indicates that if seen as problematic 
universal jurisdiction is only problematic for a particular reason: the social construction of 
space. Territory is not a natural thing but is in need of being ‘naturalized.’ Universal 
jurisdiction is thus not per se problematic but only due to a spatial constellation of jurisdiction 
which is subject to a politics of space. ‘There is a politics of space because space is 
political’.104 Because of this political ‘nature’ of space, it is problematic to locate the 
transnational legal process per se in a ‘transnational space’ that, as a matter of consequence, 
cannot be implicated as already existing. Rather, we find the social—or here: socio-legal—
construction of ‘the transnational’ as space, whereas a controversy arises about how the 
meaning of such space is to be determined. While the global human rights community has 
hoped to effectively construct ‘the transnational’ as space in such a way that international 
human rights norms are superior to territorial jurisdiction, the court has sustained the 
established construction of ‘the transnational’ as space with the state as the gatekeeper even 
of global law.  
“What do you still want to know, then?” asks the gatekeeper. “You are insatiable.” 
“Everyone strives after the law,” says the man, “so how is that in these many years no 
one except me has requested entry?” The gatekeeper sees that the man is already dying 
and, in order to reach his diminishing sense of hearing, he shouts at him, “Here no one 
else can gain entry, since this entrance was assigned only to you. I’m going now to 
close it.105 
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